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Even though the phenomenological relations between perception and stimulus have
been firmly established, a theoretical argument for Weber’s and Fechner’s law in
terms of relevant models or from statistical physics is largely missing. We present
such a discussion in terms of response theory for nonequilibrium systems, where the
induced displacement or current, which stands for the perceived stimulus, crucially
depends on the change in time-symmetric reactivities. Stationary nonequilibria may
indeed generate extra currents by changing the dynamical activity. The argument
finishes by understanding how the extra dynamical activity logarithmically encodes
the actual stimulus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Weber’s law (1834) and Fechner’s extension (1860) summarize the basic phenomenology
of perception. They belong to the field of psychophysics and neuronal physiology more
generally, which has been of central interest to physics from the time of Helmholtz to recent
revivals in what is now called the field of neurophysics.
Weber’s law speaks about the accuracy of discrimination. Whether by touch, sound, light
or smell, whenever we compare two sensations, there appears a limit to the accuracy of our
discrimination and that keenness varies, at least in many cases, with the magnitude of the
agitation. For example, if for a load we are merely able to distinguish a mass of 100g from
one of 108 gram, we would typically need a difference of 80g to notice the unequity of two
masses of about 1kg. That is, the just-noticeable-difference between the magnitudes of two
stimuli increases proportional to the magnitude.
Fechner continued from there to state that the perceived stimulus is logarithmic in the
actual stimulus: Ip = K log I/I0 for a constant K, where I is the actual intensity of the
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2stimulus when I > I0 and Ip is the perceived one; I0 can be identified with the treshold
for perception. E.g., I could be the luminous intensity of a source and Ip would be the
apparent brightness for eye light-intensity response.
It is no surprise that the Weber law about the accuracy of discrimination is a consequence
of the Fechner law Ip = K log(I/I0) for the relation between perceived and actual stimulus
intensities. We only need to state that a difference in perception is possible at ∆Ip ∼ 1
(arbitrary units) to find that at that threshold K∆I ∼ I implying we need a difference ∆I
in actual stimulus growing in proportion with the absolute intensity I. Therefore, no extra
explanation of Weber’s law is needed beyond that interpretation of Fechner’s relation.
Those laws constitute a regularity in sensation that has been confirmed in a great variety
of experiments, auditu et tactu as written in the title of [1], over a wide range of stimulus
strengths. It has been observed with many animal species as well, and in much greater
variety of sensations than originally discussed in the works of Weber and Fechner [1, 2].
There are a number of generalizations and corrections, [3, 4], depending on the type of
stimulus and on their range but in all, Weber-Fechner laws stand out as widely established
phenomenology of psychophysics.
Over the last two centuries, from the sensory and nerve physiology pioneered by
von Helmholtz to today’s neuroscience, imaging data and knowledge about perception
and sensation have immensily increased without clearly revealing however the physics
behind that “foundation stone of experimental psychology,” [5]. Sure enough, analogies
have been made and equivalences exposed between Weber-Fechner behavior and certain
chemophysical or neuronal properties. For example in [6], the Fechner law is associated to
charge transport over solid-solid or solid-liquid interfaces, assuming the response behavior
of the receptor follows the Elovich equation and that the generation of response is simply
and directly proportional to stimulus intensity. As a more recent example, in [7] Weber’s
law is tied to the dependence of reaction times under stimuli; see also [8] for the underlying
decision model. Nevertheless, there is no uniquely or broadly accepted explanation of the
Weber-Fechner laws from more elementary physics principles [4].
There are probably a number of reasons for this lack of foundation, not only that the
laws are approximate anyhow. First, after the pioneering work in the 19th century, the
phenomenology has been known and discussed most of all in the psychology literature
3and in the context of human preception, which obviously does not simplify matters for
physics. The Weber-Fechner laws have a vagueness or subjectivity in their ‘human’
formulation, using such terms as “accuracy of discrimination,” “threshold of sensation” and
“perceived perception,” which makes them less accessible for a mechanistic explanation.
Objective ‘material’ facts seem to be missing from the laws until the advent of modern
neurophysiology. There is however also a second class of reasons why the Weber-Fechner
laws have remained elusive, and that has to do with the status of response theory in
physics. For the most part, in teaching and in applications, that has been restricted to
linear response and to equilibrium systems. The so-called fluctuation-dissipation theorem,
the Einstein relation and Kubo theory of linear response traditionally deal with the
close-to-equilibrium regime and pre-suppose a linear regime where force and displacement
are linearly related [9–11]. Those criteria are of course not met for human or animal
perception. Stimuli need not be small and the whole sensory equipment is subject to im-
portant active processes where fluctuation-dissipation relations are violated; see e.g. [12, 13].
Also for the line of arguments in the present paper it is essential to mention that
perception can be split into two basic processes, an initial stage where the stimulus is
coded in neuronal activity and a final stage where brain activity is coupled to cognitive
and muscular processes creating the perceived stimulus. Our ambition is not to model that
full and complicated sequence of transmissions and conversions and we remain far from
neurobiological details. Our main innovation regards the final stages of the perception
process where we interpret perceived stimulus as current or displacement induced by a
collection of activated components. In the main part we derive from response theory
how excess activity determines the induced forces and currents. Response for active and
nonequilibrium systems is a subject of much recent interest and we use the ideas in e.g.
[14–17]. For the initial stage of perception, only in Section III B do we add to model the
conversion of stimulus into neuronal activity, which is where the logarithm happens. We
argue for the naturalness of such encoding of the actual stimulus as excess reactivity.
The present paper is thus adding the following ingredients to arrive at a statistical
foundation of Weber-Fechner laws:
1) Interpreting perception or the perceived stimulus as displacement (e.g. in generating
a shift in positions or velocities) we get rid of the subjective formulation and we make
4the Weber-Fechner laws a subject of response theory. The actual stimulus is assumed to
perturb (only) the time-symmetric reactivity in a driven Markov jump process modeling
neuronal activity;
2) Applying nonequilibrium response theory, we show that the induced excess in dynamical
activity governs that displacement. Therefore, from arguing logarithmic dependence in the
coding of a stimulus in neuronal activity, we arrive at the Weber-Fechner laws.
In Section III we connect the Weber-Fechner phenomenology with response theory. It
is the time-symmetric dynamical activity which is changed by the stimulus and which de-
termines a corresponding displacement or perception. We first present in Section II two
simple models to illustrate that main idea. In Section III B we end with arguments for the
log-dependence of reaction rates on stimuli. Note also that the logarithmic response does
not always get validated by the empirical facts; there are exceptions and limitations. We
briefly discuss in Section III C how and where those may arise, such as in the power-law
response summarized in Stevens’ law [3].
II. PERCEIVED STIMULUS FROM EXCESS ACTIVITY
Two simple examples can illustrate how excess in dynamical activity (visible in escape
rate and reactivity) contributes to and even determines the current when fixing the out-of-
equilibrium condition in terms of driving. In the first example, we consider driven passive
particles for which the current gets amplified by increasing the dynamical activity. The
example has no relation with neuronal physiology, but illustrates the principle. In the second
example, the particles are active and no net current needs to be present, until coupled with
firing bits. That example is already providing a toy-modeling of later stages in perception.
In all events, in the present section we are only concerned with the issue how changes in
dynamical activity generate (extra) displacement.
A. Passive model
A dilute collection of charges are driven through a narrow tube. The solvent is a viscous
fluid in equilibrium at temperature T . There is a constant force E > 0 on the charges, say
5to the right. Imagining that the tube is spatially periodic in one dimension with cells of size
L, we take the model of a biased continuous-time random walk; integers x correspond to
the cells in the tube. The transition rates to hop to the right-neighboring, respectively to
the left-neighboring cell, are
k(x, x+ 1) = p, k(x, x− 1) = q
where we require that p/q = exp[EL/kBT ], expressing that the ratio of forward to backward
rates is given by the entropy flux to the environment in units of the Boltzmann constant kB
(condition of local detailed balance; see [14]). Writing EL/kBT = ε, we thus have
k(x, x+ 1) = ξ(ε)
1
1 + e−ε
, k(x, x− 1) = ξ(ε) 1
1 + eε
(1)
where the escape rate ξ(ε) := p + q may well depend on the driving E . We fix a large ε;
that is the reference condition of the passive nonequilibrium system. At that moment, the
expected current, the net displacement of particles from cell to cell, equals
〈v〉ε = L (p− q) = L ξ(ε) sinh ε
1 + cosh ε
(2)
Note that it is the escape rate ξ(ε) that for large ε decides the current behavior (2). It may
+ b(I)
ε ε
FIG. 1: Larger (blue) spheres are driven by an external field ε in a tube with an irregular interior,
dissipating into the viscous liquid represented by smaller (green) spheres. There are obstacles
drawn as blobs sticking out of the wall. Left, before the extra activity b(I) has been added: the
escape rate ξ(ε) may get very low in high driving ε. Right, the extra activity b(I) has increased
the escape rate and hence the flux. Figure courtesy of Tirthankar Banerjee.
very well be that ξ(ε) ↓ 0 for large ε, depending on trapping or caging mechanism such as in
6the left picture of Fig. 1. The standard fluctuation–dissipation relation is violated for large
ε. In contrast, to linear order in ε the dependence ξ(ε) is irrelevant except for ξ(0) 6= 0:
〈v〉ε = L ξ(ε = 0) ε/2. See also [18, 19].
Next, a stimulus of some sort is applied with intensity I, shaking up each cell in such a way,
we assume, that the escape rate changes according to
ξ(ε)
stimulus−→ ξ(ε, I) = ξ(ε) + b(I) (3)
for excess parameter b = b(I) growing with I. We have not specified the mechanism, we
only assumed that the stimulus modified the escape rate ξ(ε), suggesting that on average
the dynamical activity of the charges has increased. See Fig. 1 for a cartoon.
We interpret the change in the current as the perceived stimulus:
Ip = 〈v〉Iε − 〈v〉ε = L b(I)− L ξ(ε =∞) (4)
for large driving ε ↑ ∞. The point here is that the extra reactivity b(I) decides the displace-
ment in current, Ip ∝ b(I) when ξ(ε = ∞) ' 0. Looking ahead to Section III B: when the
excess in escape rate is logarithmic in the stimulus strength I, b(I) ∼ log I, from (4) we get
Weber-Fechner phenomenology Ip ∼ log I + constant.
B. Active model
Imagine next motion on the circle S1 characterized by an angle θt ∈ [0, 2pi] and coupled
to N bits ηt(i) = 0, 1. The angle-coordinate follows the overdamped equation
θ˙t = −U ′(θt)− u′(θt) (ηt(1) + . . .+ ηt(N)) (5)
for energy functions U and u, where we ignore thermal noise and put the mobility to one (per
second). The energies are defined in units of kBT for fixed environment temperature T . The
idea is that the angular velocity represents the perceived stimulus Ip and the bit-dynamics
is a spacetime conversion of the actual stimulus I. Whenever some ηt(i) = 1 an extra push
is given to the angle. Each bit ηt(i) independently flips 0
`,r←→ 1 over two possible channels,
left (`) and right (r), with transition rates that depend on the angle,
k`(0, 1) = a`(θ) e
− 1
2
[u(θ)+ε], kr(0, 1) = a e
− 1
2
[u(θ)−ε] (6)
k`(1, 0) = a`(θ) e
1
2
[u(θ)+ε], kr(1, 0) = a e
1
2
[u(θ)−ε]
7For consistency, we use the same interaction energy u(θ)η(i) in (5) as in (6). The nonequi-
librium is parametrized by the parameter ε > 0 which breaks the left/right symmetry. For
large ε a bit gets typically loaded 0 → 1 from the right channel, and typically decharges
(“fires”) via the left channel. There it gets coupled with the angle-coordinate via the (aver-
age) rate a`. In that way, the initial (digitalized) signal gets transduced “from the right” to
the more macroscopic variable θ “to the left,” see the representation in Fig. 2.
η
η
(2)
(1)u
ε
ε
θt
η(Ν)
FIG. 2: Firing bits ηt(i) coupled to angle variable θt via potential u. The nonequilibrium is fixed
by parameter ε, allowing the extra activity a→ a` = a(1 +λ b cos θ) to create angular flux. Figure
courtesy of Tirthankar Banerjee.
For the average firing rate we choose a`(θ) = a(1+λ b cos θ) > 0 with reference frequency
a, excess b > 0 and small dimensionless coupling λ ≥ 0 with λb < 1. Again we think of
b = b(I) as a coding of stimulus I. The equations (5)–(6) define the active dynamics with
ηt(i) playing the role of dichotomous noise as in the telegraph equation or for run-and-tumble
particles; see [20].
Assuming that the bit relaxes almost instantaneously on the time-scale of the angle-
coordinate (large a), the dynamics in (5) becomes θ˙t = f(θt); f(θ) := −U ′(θ)−Nu′(θ)ρθ(1)
where ρθ(1) is the stationary probability that the bit is loaded (η(i) = 1). We easily deduce
it from (6),
ρθ(1) =
1
1 + eu(θ)(1 + λ b cos θ)
in the limit of large ε [20]. For b = 0 the force f(θ) = −V ′(θ) is derivable from a potential
V ; there can be no angular current then. On the other hand, for large b, a loaded bit fires
8almost instantly along the left channel. The rotational part of the quasistatic force f is its
circle integral
F (b) = −
∮
dθ
Nu′(θ)
1 + eu(θ)(1 + λ b cos θ)
which is essentially linear in b for weak coupling λ,
F (b) = K b, K :=
λN
2
∮
dθ sin θ tanh(u(θ)/2)
As a consequence, whenever K 6= 0 and for b > b0, we have many choices of reference
potential U so that f(θ) > kb for some k > 0 and there appears an angular current (i.e.,
perceived output) which is proportional to b, meaning that the perceived stimulus Ip ∝ b(I).
The b0 corresponds to the just-noticeable-difference in Weber’s law. That is the analogue of
(4). The only remaining assumption to obtain Weber-Fechner behavior is again to assume
that b ∝ log I in a range of stimuli I.
III. GENERAL ARGUMENT
The wonderful universality of the Weber-Fechner laws begs for a principled answer as to
why they hold. As announced from the above models, there are two main ingredients.
One, to be discussed next under subsection III A, is the understanding how a noticeable
displacement is achieved from and is proportional to the change in reactivity. The concep-
tual framework is found in response theory around nonequilibria. Stimuli are understood
as perturbing a stationary condition of an open possibly far-from-equilibrium system. Even
while fixing the thermodynamic (mostly electrochemical) force, kinetics may change. We
interpret the strength of the resulting displacement, when exceeding some threshold, to be
the perceived stimulus. In the previous section, in the passive model Ip was the displacement
in current; in the active model Ip was the induced angular velocity. The relation between
perceived stimulus and actual stimulus, the central topic of the Weber-Fechner laws, thus
gets formulated as a subject in response theory.
The second ingredient, to be discussed under subsection III B is the quantitative iden-
tification of excess reactivity with the logarithm of the actual stimulus. We argue there
that the excess reactivity is proportional to the logarithm of the actual stimulus, giving two
9arguments — one using biased diffusion as decision model and one based on the naturalness
of logarithmic conversion from analogue to digital signaling. These two arguments do not
share the rigor of the next section (first ingredient) and corrections such as in Stevens’ law
are perfectly compatible and possible.
A. Kinetic excess
The models in the previous section are explicit because they are simple. Yet they are
on target for the dependence on kinetics. At high driving (ε  1), the reactivities gain
centerstage. That dependence on kinetics (motility, trapping configurations,...) is a typical
nonequilibrium feature, which is both source of difficulties and of richness, [21–24]. The
main point is that the response formulæ not only feature the dissipation caused by the stim-
ulus, but also correlate with the excess dynamical activity, called the frenetic contribution;
see [14, 16, 22, 24]. The usual McLennan-Zubarev ensembles describing close-to-equilibrium
physics do not suffice for that purpose; far from nonequilibrium, displacements and
differential susceptibilities are determined by (changes in) the time-symmetric dynamical
activity. That also makes the main point of the paper: the actual stimulus is encoded as
excess dynamical activity in a nonequilibrium system, causing extra displacement which is
read as the perceived stimulus.
The argument is presented with some technical details. To be specific, and keeping the
context of neuronal activity we consider a general Markov jump process wih states x, y, . . .
and transition rates
k(x, y) = a(x, y) eσ(x,y), a(x, y) = a(y, x), σ(x, y) = −σ(y, x) (7)
for the jump x → y. We call the symmetric prefactors a(x, y) reactivities, obviously
related to escape rates and reaction times. In the exponential we place antisymmetric
σ(x, y) which quanitify the nonequilibrium aspect; they are not given from a difference
σeq(x, y) = V (x)−V (y) in some state function V . The absence of such a potential V means
that the condition of detailed balance is violated. We do not specify the origin of that
breaking and many examples may be considered. Yet, the breaking of detailed balance is
crucial for the role of the reactivities. The main question is now — Suppose we have such
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a nonequilibrium system which is perturbed by changing its reaction rates: how can that
affect or generate currents?
Consider an observable F (ω) which depends on the random trajectory ω = (xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
in time-window [0, t]. Every such ω consists of jumps separated by quiescent periods. We
take the F (ω) to be time-extensive and antisymmetric under time-reversal as befits time-
integrated particle or energy currents. We call F a displacement. We look at expectations,
taking the mean over many such processes (7). Without loss of generality we suppose
that 〈F 〉 = 0 in the stationary nonequilibrium condition. The question is to see how that
expectation changes when we modify the reactivity, say a(x, y) → a(x, y)(1 + λ b(x, y)),
where the b(x, y) = b(y, x) is seen as the perturbation. The answer from nonequilibrium
response theory [14] is that we get a (new) expected displacement 〈F 〉b, to linear order in
λ, equal to
〈F 〉b = −λ 〈D(ω)F (ω)〉 (8)
in terms of the unperturbed expectation 〈·〉, correlating the discplacement with D(ω), the
frenesy given by
D(ω) =
∫ t
0
ds
∑
y
a(xs, y)b(xs, y)e
σ(xs,y) −
∑
s
b(xs− , xs) (9)
where the last sum is over the jump times in ω. The point is already visible: the response
is proportional to the excess or additional reactivity. That would not be true in the case
of detailed balance; then, around equilibrium 〈·〉 = 〈·〉eq we have 〈D(ω)F (ω)〉eq = 0 by
time-reversal invariance since D is time-symmetric. Secondly, the response relation (8)
decisively uses that the antisymmetric factors σ(x, y) have not been modified. We refer to
[14, 22, 23] for more details. Taking the situation far from equilibrium as parametrized by
σ(x, y) = ε v(x, y) with ε ↑ ∞, we only retain in the first sum (9) the transitions x → y
for which σ(x, y) > 0. Moreover, to allow for saturation of the mean displacement 〈F 〉b as
ε ↑ ∞, we are ready to take a(x, y) to depend on ε so that a(x, y) exp εv(x, y)→ a whenever
v(x, y) ≥ 0. We conclude that the far-from-equilibrium response (8) gives
〈F 〉b = −λ 〈B(ω)F (ω)〉 (10)
where
B(ω) := a
∫ t
0
ds
∑
y:σ(xs,y)>0
b(xs, y)−
∑
s
b(xs, xs+)
11
is proportional to the excess reactivity. In the simplest scenario, the reaction channels do
not change under the applied stimulus I and we simply put b(x, y) = b(I) > 0 constant,
yielding
B(ω) =
[
a
∫ t
0
ns −Nt
]
b(I)
for ns the number of available y where σ(xs, y) > 0 and Nt the total number of jumps in ω.
In all, we get
fb = K b(I), K := λ lim
t
1
t
〈[Nt − a
∫ t
0
ns]F (ω)〉 (11)
for the expected flux fb := limt〈F 〉b/t under a change in reactivity b. The fb can be directly
identified with the perceived stimulus Ip or we can still use that fb to create an angular
velocity which is then taken as Ip. For example in a dynamics for an angle θ ∈ [0, 2pi] of the
form
θ˙ = −U ′(θ) + fb, Ip =
[∮
1
−U ′(θ) + fbdθ
]−1
∝ b(I) (12)
the fb functions as a force. Clearly, the rotational force fb causes a current Ip for b large
enough, to overcome a possible barrier imposed by potential U . That defines the just-
noticeable excess b0, as we interpret the emerging current or velocity as the perceived stim-
ulus. The choice of dynamics (12) is not the most general one, nor does it share neurobi-
ological complexity. Yet, details or variations on the same theme do not affect the general
conclusions.
B. The logarithm
Stimulus starts by currents being injected into the dendritic tree and being transformed
into a train of spikes. That response of a neuron to synaptic input is not the main subject
of the present paper but must be considered to complete the argument.
The states x in the Markov process (7) represent a large number of chemomechanical
configurations possibly involving many interacting components. Reaction rates for neurons
are indeed the result of multi-level activities as they involve stimulus processing, decision
making, and response programming. It often involves cognitive aspects as well. Information
flow within an organism is of course a complicated issue. Nevertheless, gaining simplicity
from our mathematical modeling, it is not unreasonable to locate the dependence of reaction
times in the symmetric prefactor (reactivity) a(x, y) of the transition rates. How then does
12
spiking or the firing rates depend on the magnitude of the stimulus?
Clearly, the question belongs to the field of neural coding, where one possible approach
is called rate coding. In many cases and over various regimes, as the intensity of a
stimulus increases, the frequency of “spike firing” increases. In other words, there is good
experimental evidence that reaction times decrease with the magnitude of the stimulus;
see e.g. [7, 25]. Whether there is a logarithmic dependence is however a more subtle and
detailed issue. For the optimality of the logarithmic scale from the point of view of evolution
of the cognitive apparatus, see e.g. [26]. It is in general agreed that the distribution of
spike rates within any neural tissue follows a lognormal distribution, whether at rest or
when stimulated; see [27]. However, each individual neuron is rather stable in its firing rate,
and variability in mean spike rate is to be understood over the whole population. Neurons
spike with 510fold different mean rates which increases the dynamic range of a neuronal
population. Therefore, logarithmic dependence of firing rates on stimulus strength should
be seen in the ensemble sense. We give two rather general theoretical arguments for the
dependence b(I) ∼ log I of the mean excess reactivity b on the stimulus I.
We start with heuristics belonging to a diffusion model for reactivities.
A widely-used model for estimating reaction times is to have a decision variable Xt to
undergo biased diffusion in the interval [−1, 1]; see for example Section 10 in [8]. The time
to reach the upper boundary (if at all) gives the reaction time. Here again we can use
statistical mechanics as the question relates to first-passage problems. More specifically we
look at splitting probabilities representing reactivities and we know that those probabilities
vary linearly in the bias. See e.g. Eq. 2.2.11 in [28] where the bias is represented by the
initial position X0 and the splitting probability varies linearly in the relative distance
between X0 and the boundary. Similarly, when the bias is represented as the gradient ∇µ
of a chemical potential, the reaction time is linear in ∇µ. In all events, the linearity implies
that the question becomes how the bias (hence the excess reactivity b(I)) in that diffusion
process should depend on the stimulus I.
Continuing the diffusion analogy and language where the bias represents the gradient
in chemical potential, we think of the stimulus I as the extra density which causes the
gradient. In other words, the stimulus I corresponds to an extra density or pressure at
13
one end of the gas tube, where the bias b making the asymmetry is a gradient in chemical
potential. Similarly, the initial position X0 represents the difference in chemical potential
between the two ends of the interval causing a drift. The conclusion mimics therefore the
logaritmic dependence of chemical potential on density or pressure in a free gas. Driving
in irreversible thermodynamics is achieved from gradients in chemical potential which vary
logarithmically with the density (stimulus).
Secondly and as prime statistical argument, we consider the conversion of an analogue
signal (stimulus) into a digital one (neuronal activity). A stimulus of strength I is causing
neurons in a certain region to fire more often per unit time. There is no change in nonequi-
librium driving, that remains provided by biochemical engines such as the hydrolysis of
ATP. Firing encodes the stimulus, and the stimulus selects the neuronal activity. Clearly,
storing information of a signal with strength I requires log I binary signals, to be divided
over neurons and their firing rate. In that way, the spacetime activity is of (binary nature)
of order log I. In the end and similar to the logarithm defining Boltzmann’s entropy, log I
is the number of bit-variables over spacetime for representing the stimulus I. As the spatial
region for neuronal action is limited, the storage happens extensively in the temporal
domain, by increasing the firing rate in proportion with log I.
C. Limitations
We summarize the main line of reasoning. The Weber-Fechner laws can be stated in
the framework of response theory around nonequilibrium. It is assumed that a stimulus
I only affects the frenetic component, i.e., causing an excess b(I) in the time-symmetric
dynamical activity or reactivities. Far-from-equilibrium response theory shows that the
induced displacement or current is proportional to that excess frenesy b(I). We identify
that displacement with the perceived stimulus Ip. If the stimulus strength I is converted
into neuronal activity by shifting the mean reactivity by order b(I) ∼ log I, then the above
suffices for arguing Fechner’s law, and so follows Weber’s law.
We mention some limitations of the above reasonings. First, we have assumed thoughout
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that the coupling between the applied stimulus and the reaction rate is sufficiently small.
That was evidenced from the small coupling λ and the application of linear response. That
obviously also limits from above the value of b and hence it bounds the allowed log I from
above: we cannot expect to find Weber-Fechner behavior for very large values of log I (but
I itself can be relatively big). Secondly, we have not only assumed conditions which break
the fluctuation-dissipaton relation (which is needed) but we have for simplicity taken far-
from-equilibrium reference conditions. That is probably not necessary but it will correct the
strict linearity of the response fb in the excess reactivities b. In the same way, we assumed
that the dynamics of the collective coordinate (the angle θ) through which the stimulus
becomes perceived, is not noisy. That zero-temperaure condition is again not truly needed
but corrections will of course occur, be it small ones. Finally, while the upshot of much
experimental work on reactivity in neuronal networks is compatible with the hypothesis
that the stimulus causes an excess in reaction rate which scales logarithmically in the actual
stimulus, b ∝ log I, there is also evidence of power law behavior. Then, the function b(I)
scales with some power of I in certain regimes, obviously and straightforwardly modifying
the Weber-Fechner laws in the direction of e.g. Stevens’ law, [3, 4]. Moreover, the increase
in neuronal firing rate (e.g. by reducing the membrane time constant when modeled as
capacitance) is obviously not unlimited; for very high synaptic input, firing rates tend to
decrease again (e.g. by shunting membrane potential fluctuations).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
With the advent of nonequilibrium fluctuation theory, new avenues have been opened to
solving problems and understanding phenomena of biophysics and psychophysics. Part of
that is nonequilibrium response theory that we use in this paper as framework for discussing
the Weber-Fechner laws. The central observation is that the dependence of reactivities on
the actual stimulus decides the response when the system is far enough from equilibrium.
Weber-Fechner phenomenology then follows from two hypotheses (1) that the perceived
stimulus is a displacement (or current) in response to changes in neuronal activity, (2) that
mean excess in the addressed ensemble of neuronal reactivities scales with the logarithm
of the actual stimulus. Corrections to (2) such as a power-law dependence of reactivity on
stimulus lead to Stevens’ law.
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